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Abstract 
Studies of compensating discrimination (known in the U.S. as affirmative action) have not 
accounted for the role of envy. Yet envy affects utility. I consider the compensating- 
discrimination policies that individuals acknowledging envy would choose when behind a 
veil of ignorance. The institutional background for my study is India, where low castes have 
been provided with preferential access to public education and reserved public sector jobs.  
Although the Indian case is background, the conclusions apply more generally. I define envy 
as occurring when people with the same abilities have different incomes because of unequal 
education and employment opportunities. This is the case when, because of adverse 
discrimination, low-caste people are denied access to education and public-sector jobs, and 
also when, because of compensating discrimination, it is high-caste people who are 
correspondingly denied equal access. A benchmark case with neither adverse nor 
discriminatory discrimination is efficient and equitable (envy-free). Adverse and 
compensating discrimination both compromise efficiency and fairness. I derive the conditions 
that determine attitudes of a population behind the veil of ignorance to compensating-
discrimination policies. 
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1. Introduction 
Compensating discrimination (or affirmative action) has been studied in various contexts. In 
particular, a large number of studies examine to the Indian caste system.1 There has however 
been no study of the fairness of compensating discrimination when there is disutility from 
envy. Perhaps the reason for disregarding envy has been that being envious is an unpleasant 
personal attribute. Why should people care about others' income and why are they 
discontented with their own absolute income?2 Although envy has been disregarded in 
previous literature on the caste system, nonetheless envy is a fundamental human trait that 
underlies human behaviour. Envy also influences choice of ideology, which in turn affects 
institutions and economic policy (see Hillman, 2009, chapter 1). Ignoring envy ignores basic 
reality. I therefore introduce envy and consider the compensating-discrimination policies that 
individuals subject to envy would choose behind a veil of ignorance where they do not know 
if they will benefit from adverse or compensating discrimination. The institutional 
background for my study is India, where compensating discrimination programs provide low 
castes with preferential access to public education and reserved public sector jobs.  Although 
the Indian case is background, the conclusions apply more generally.  
Social justice can be defined as ex-ante or ex-post equality. In the pre-compensating 
discrimination period, there was ex-ante inequality across castes because high-caste persons 
were privileged. Compensating discrimination aims at achieving ex-ante equality through 
special opportunities for low-caste members to correct historical injustice. However, 
compensating discrimination also imposes ex-ante inequality and fails to achieve ex-post 
equality because of inequality in incomes between equally productive persons of different 
castes.  
Inequality under the caste system either in the pre- or in the post-compensating 
discrimination period is the source of envy in different ways. The outcome under adverse 
discrimination was not equitable: there was envy in that a person belonging to a low-caste 
would prefer a high-caste person's possessions and status.3 Envy was qualified, since low-
caste persons would be driven by the hierarchical system to consider themselves inferior. 
                                                 
1
 See for example Ramaswami (1984), Aikara (1996), Mendelsohn and Visziany (1998), Sheth (1998), 
Wankhede (2001), Pande (2003), Alexander (2003), Sowell (2004), Weisskopf (2004), Borooah, Dubey and Iyer 
(2007) et al. 
2
 Experimental economics provides answers to these questions using concepts of equity and social preferences 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Lehmann, 2001; Charness and Rabin, 2002 et al.). For an 
overview of envy in experiments, see Holler and Leroch (2010), who also consider conceptions of fairness more 
generally going back to Adam Smith. 
3
 According to Foley's (1967) definition of equity. 
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With compensating discrimination, envy is reversed: a high-caste person envies a low-caste 
person because of the perceived undeserved low-caste person’s good fortune through the 
privilege of compensating discrimination. My focus in this paper is on such reversal of envy.4 
The envy of low-caste people under adverse discrimination is due to deprivation from 
lack of access to public schools and a host of other restrictions; with compensating 
discrimination, envy on the part of high-caste people is due to their relative deprivation.5 
Empirical evidence confirms that positional concern can create envy in the mind of an 
individual whose situation is below his or her own aspiration level (Fischer and Trogler, 
2006). Experimental evidence also shows that workers generally treat unequal wages as 
relative deprivation (Martin, 1981). 
 In my model, high-caste individuals in the post-compensating discrimination period 
experience the feeling of relative deprivation even when wages are equal, because the equal 
wage fails to account for different productivities. In a particular type of job, wages are the 
same for all individuals irrespective of caste but minimum eligibility criteria for the reserved 
positions are relaxed for the low caste.  
Both adverse and reverse discrimination undermine efficiency and conceptions of 
fairness. Envy behind the veil of ignorance reduces individuals' expected utility.6 If the 
expected utility loss due to envy of the low-caste people under adverse discrimination is 
greater than that due to high-caste people's envy under reverse discrimination, I judge the 
post-compensating discrimination outcome as equity-improving.  
Whether a population behind the veil of ignorance prefers adverse or compensating 
discrimination depends on the trade-off between efficiency and equity (no-envy) in social 
outcomes.  The post-compensating discrimination outcome is not achieved through Pareto-
improving change because the reservation policy provides opportunities for low-caste to the 
detriment of the high-caste. Pareto-improving change is of course possible if gainers gain 
more than losers lose and compensation occurs. However, compensation does not occur. 
Compensating discrimination is efficiency-improving if the net gain in expected utility due to 
access as well as higher returns to education of the low-caste individuals, exceed the expected 
utility loss due to reverse discrimination towards the high-caste people. If these efficiency- 
                                                 
4
 In the Indian daily news paper sometimes we find the front-page headline as "Self-immolation by some high-
caste students or job-seekers as a protest against the caste-based reservation". This is nothing but an expression 
of extremely envious attitude.  
5
 See, Ben-Zeev (1992) for some examples showing how relative deprivation causes envy.  
6
 Also see Lehmann (2001) who demonstrates that in a two-person competition, presence of envy in an 
individual’s mind reduces his payoff and total satisfaction (social welfare) becomes lower than that when both 
parties are self-centered. 
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and equity-improving criteria are satisfied compensating discrimination is regarded as 
fairness-improving.  
The questions to be addressed are: How (if at all) does envy change the usual 
conclusions about the compensating discrimination policy and is the compensating-
discrimination policy fairness-improving? The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets 
out the institutional background of compensating discrimination policy in India. Section 3 
reviews concepts of equity, efficiency and fairness. Section 4 sets out the model of policy 
choice behind a veil of ignorance. Conclusions are in the final section.  
2. The institutional background 
Compensating-discrimination policies have been implemented in many countries, including 
the U.S., South Africa, Malaysia, Brazil, Nigeria, India, and Sri Lanka. The intent has been to 
compensate present generations of under-privileged groups for past discrimination. In 
contrast to other anti-discrimination measures, compensating discrimination aims at ending 
differences across gender, races, castes, and communities on a pro-active basis, hence the 
term ‘affirmative’ in the U.S. context (Holzer and Neumark, 2000). In India, a caste-based 
reservation system evaluates a person not on the basis of personal merit, achievement, or 
personal characteristics but rather on the basis of birth. Castes are hereditary, mutually 
exclusive, endogamous and occupation-specific. The Indian caste system consists of four 
distinct social classes (called Varna) hierarchically ranked according to prestige, political 
power, economic dominance and educational privileges. I shall consider only two broad 
categories – lower castes and higher castes. 
Land and power have long been concentrated in India in the hands of the higher castes 
while the lower castes provided services to the higher castes (Kumar, 1982; Banerjee and 
Knight, 1985). To correct for caste-based inequalities, the government of India enacted 
compensating discrimination policies shortly after independence (in 1951, 4 years after the 
end of the British colonial rule), reinforcing and amending reforms that can be traced back to 
British colonial-era reservation programs (Kumar, 1992). The former untouchable castes 
(presently known as dalits) and some tribal communities, who have been socially and 
economically marginalised, are the target group of the reservation policy. They are defined 
(under article 366 of India’s Constitution) as the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled 
Tribes (STs), and make up some 16-17 percent and 7-8 percent of the total Indian population 
respectively. The Constitution of India (article 46) allows for special provisions for members 
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of these two disadvantaged groups. Compensating discrimination by the Indian government 
has entailed two-fold steps. Actions were taken to prevent discrimination against the low-
caste members (SCs and STs). Also compensating discrimination for the low castes was 
introduced by reserving seats (22.5 percent among which 15 percent are for SCs and 7.5 
percent are for STs) in the legislature (political reservation), in government-sponsored 
educational institutions (educational reservation) and in public sector jobs (job reservation), 
with the objective of “empowering” the lower castes.7  
3. Equity, efficiency and fairness  
We wish to evaluate policies by criteria of equity, efficiency, and fairness. In this regard, 
there is a bewildering variety of experimental evidence on individuals’ preferences. In some 
experiments, people are selfishly motivated and in other cases people have “other regarding” 
preferences. Fehr and Schmidt (2006, chapter 8) classify theories of “other regarding 
preferences” under headings of models of “social preferences”, “interdependent preferences” 
and “intention-based reciprocity”. Models with social preferences8 view an individual as 
caring about material resources allocated to other individuals within a reference group. There 
may also be altruism, envy, or inequity aversion. Inter-caste inequality resulting from 
discrimination is in particular the source of envy. There can also be envy within groups, 
which is not taken into account in my model. An individual’s utility is affected by envy when 
people have the same innate learning ability but are from different castes. The reference 
group of a low-caste individual therefore consists of high-caste individuals with the same 
innate ability, and vice-versa.9  
Envy-freeness is an appealing concept of equity (Rabin, 1993; Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Konow, 2003; Clippel, 2008). Equity means no-envy: an 
allocation is equitable if no individual prefers others’ possession to his/her own possessions 
(Foley, 1967; Varian, 1974; Kolm, 1995). For an allocation to be fair, it must be equitable as 
                                                 
7
 The percentage of positions reserved for SCs and STs varies at the state level according to the approximate 
proportions of these groups in each state. Also in 1992, 27 percent of positions were reserved for other backward 
classes (OBC) belonging to different castes and communities whose position was marginally better than that of 
the SCs and STs but worse than that of the higher-caste group (following the recommendation of Mandal 
Commission set up in 1979).   
8
 In models of “interdependent preferences” and “intention based reciprocity” the individuals, in addition to 
own monetary payoff, are concerned respectively by the 'type' and 'intention' of the reference agents.  
9
 My envy-based specification of preferences, therefore, differs from the "keeping up with the Joneses" 
attribute of preferences, which refers to the idea that an individual's utility depends on the individual's 
consumption relative to the total past or present consumption of the society. My model shares the idea put 
forward by the inequity aversion literature that people dislike inequality that makes them worse off, but I rule out 
the symmetry that people also dislike inequality that makes them better off. 
 5 
well as Pareto-efficient (Varian, 1974)10, but some economists define fairness only in the 
sense of no-envy (see, e.g., Feldman and Kirman, 1974; Chaudhuri, 1986; Diamantaras and 
Thomson, 1990; Nishimura, 2003a,b; Chavas, 2008). Compatibility between equity/fairness 
and efficiency is a highly debated issue.11 My model shows that post-compensating 
discrimination allocation can be efficiency-improving only at the expense of equity – which is 
consistent with equity and efficiency as mutually exclusive. Envy can be efficiency-
enhancing or the source of inefficiency, depending on how envy affects incentives (Hillman 
(2009, chapter 1).12 
Also of relevance as background for my model is a literature on identity and economic 
outcomes (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Rapoport and Weiss, 2003) and expressive utility 
from confirming identity (Hillman, 2010). An individual’s group identity determines his or 
her economic ex-post outcome when individuals in different groups are identical ex-ante in 
education or in innate qualities (Basu, 2006). Also, experiments conducted by Hoff and 
Pandey (2006) suggest that discrimination shapes social identity among castes such that, after 
equal opportunities across groups are provided, low-caste people still do not take advantage 
of opportunities when social identity or status is publicly revealed. In my model 
compensating discrimination based on social identity results in different ex-post economic 
outcomes for individuals with the same innate learning abilities, with caste-identity 
generating envy in the mind of the unprivileged group. 
4. The model  
I view individuals behind a veil of ignorance as identical, with the same utility function and 
facing the same uncertainty about future incomes. Individuals know the probabilities of 
                                                 
10
 Also Piketty (1994) defines a fair allocation as one that satisfies the Pareto-optimality criterion as well as 
equal liberty in the sense that every individual must have an access to the same set of opportunities, which is 
equivalent to the ‘no-envy’ criterion as long as the individual is rational, because rationality guides the individual 
to choose the most preferred bundle from the given opportunity set. 
11
 In the context of classical exchange economies, unanimous envy (i.e., every agent envies another) cannot 
exist in an efficient allocation (Varian, 1974) but it is also possible to have unanimous envy at the interim stage 
even with interim efficient allocation rules if there is asymmetric information regarding the fundamentals of the 
economy among the agents in course of contracting (Clippel, 2008). A competitive market can result in a fair 
allocation only when the purchasing power among consumers is not very unequally distributed (Chavas, 2008).  
12
 Mui (1995) considers a setting in which a follower attempts to retaliate against an innovation introduced by 
an innovator, with a personal cost justified by envy – and innovation may therefore be deterred. Grund and 
Sliwka (2002) demonstrate that for a given prize structure greater efforts are exerted in a tournament among 
inequity averse agents compared to among agents with purely self-regarding preferences, because anticipation of 
envy – feelings of disadvantageous inequality – provide greater incentives for increasing efforts than that of 
compassion - feelings of advantageous inequality - for reducing efforts. 
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outcomes in the society.13 The fairness of compensating discrimination in a caste-based 
society is judged by comparing the pre- and the post-compensating discrimination allocations 
after the computation of expected utility losses from inequity and inefficiency. The 
benchmark case with which I begin has counterfactually no caste-based discrimination.  
4.1. Benchmark 
A caste-based economy is populated by a continuum of individuals of measure 1. The 
individuals behind a veil of ignorance know that they are going to born in a caste-based 
economy where Ln and Hn are respectively the proportions of the low-caste and the high-
caste groups, so that  
   1=+ HL nn               (1) 
Innate learning abilities across the caste groups are uniformly distributed on the ability space 
[ ]1,0 , such that, [ ]1,0~ Ua Lj  and [ ]1,0~ Ua Hk . Individuals within a particular caste group are 
differentially efficient in transforming time spent on learning into productive skills. They 
know that there is a continuum of jobs of measure 1 among which sp and usp are respectively 
the proportions of skilled and unskilled jobs, so that  
   1=+ uss pp               (2) 
The individuals know behind the veil of ignorance that they will be treated equally in 
facing no discrimination in access to education or choice of occupation after emergence from 
behind the veil of ignorance. In the absence of discrimination, the society appears as if there 
is no caste system. The individuals have two options - either to be educated and earn income 
as a skilled worker or not to invest in education and earn income as an unskilled worker. 
There is perfect competition and full employment in the skilled sector, and the skilled jobs are 
allocated on the basis of comparative advantage. The productivity level of an individual is 
defined as 



+
=
educationchoosessheorheifa
educationchoosenotdoessheorheif
q
i
i 1
1
   (3) 
                                                 
13
 In earlier literature, the effect of veil of ignorance on the choice of equity (equality in distributions) has been 
investigated either under risk where the risk-averse individuals know the probabilities of belonging to one group 
or under genuine uncertainty where the uncertainty-averse individuals do not know these probabilities (see 
Rawls, 1971; Andersson and Lyttkens, 1999 et al.).  
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The linear form is for simplicity. Without education all individuals are homogeneous in 
productivity.14 
An individual behind the veil of ignorance decides on education if and only if 
education enables him or her to earn net income (total wage minus cost of education) higher 
than the income he could obtain without education, i.e.,   
( ) wcwwai >−+1         (4) 
Here w  is the wage per unit of productivity level and ( )1,0∈c  is the cost of education 
parameter – a fixed proportion of wage spent on learning. After simplification,  
ci aca =>          (5)  
Definition 1: A critical agent is defined as an individual with the threshold level innate 
learning ability for choosing education, cac = .15 
Individuals with learning abilities higher than that of the critical agent opt for education. Due 
to the uniform distribution of ia  and full employment in the skilled sector, we can write: 
cp s −= 1  and cpus = . 
Definition 2: The utility function of an unskilled ( ci aa ≤ ) and a skilled ( ci aa > ) worker is  
( )( )



>−+
=≤
=
cii
ci
ii
aaifca
caaif
ayu
1
1 16
                       
where ( )ii ay  is an individual i 's income endogenously determined by learning ability.  
The wage per productivity level is set equal to unity ( 1=w ). The individuals after 
emergence from behind the veil of ignorance are equal17 in the sense that there is no ex-ante 
inequality in socio-economic status across individuals at the beginning of life and no ex-post 
inequality for individuals with the same productivity level. This implies that there is envy 
neither to begin with nor after incomes have been determined. 
                                                 
14
 See also Docquier and Rapoport (2003a,b). 
15
 Also see Kanbur and Rapoport (2005) who define the critical agent as one who is indifferent in making 
decisions whether or not to invest in education when his expected lifetime income with education does not 
exceed his lifetime income without education.   
16
 I assume a linear income utility function for simplicity. Extension to concave utility function to allow for 
risk aversion will not change the conclusions. 
17
 People after emerging from behind the veil of ignorance might be treated as unequal having different income 
levels and that kind of inequality could generate envy in the mind of low-income group, but we ignore that 
possibility for the sake of our argument. In the absence of caste-based discrimination the individuals are self-
interested and do not bother about other individuals' possessions. 
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Behind the veil of ignorance, individuals know the threshold level innate ability for 
choosing education and the income distribution across the skilled and unskilled workers in the 
society. Without having knowledge of their own ability, they do not know whether they will 
earn income as skilled or unskilled labour. An individual behind the veil of ignorance 
computes expected utility as:  
( ) ( )∫∫ −+−+=
1
0
11
c
c
a
a
dacacdacEU            (6) 
After calculation, Eq.(6) yields, 
2
773 32 cccEU −+−= .                         (7) 
In the absence of caste-based discrimination, education allows individual improvement and 
the outcome is efficient as well as equitable. 
4.2. Adverse discrimination 
The individuals behind the veil of ignorance now do not know whether they will belong to 
low- or high-caste group but they do know that there is caste-based discrimination in access 
to education and in choice of jobs in the society. All low-caste individuals without the 
opportunity to choose education will be homogeneous with the level of productivity,  
 
LL
j njq ∈∀= ,1          (8) 
and earn income as unskilled workers. Because of access to educational opportunities, the 
productivity level of an individual k  belonging to the high-caste group will be:  
 



+
=
educationchoosessheorheifa
educationchoosenotdoessheorheif
q
k
H
k 1
1
   (9) 
The income level of a high-caste individual will be endogenously determined by 
personal learning ability. An individual k  will choose education if and only if  
H
ck aca =>          (10) 
Where Hca  is the critical agent in the high-caste group. Behind the veil of ignorance, 
individuals know that because of discrimination the skilled jobs will be allocated only to the 
educated high-caste individuals on basis of personal productivity.18 
                                                 
18
 The utility function below does not take into account other-regarding preferences. A high-caste individual is 
not envious and the possibility of extra utility gain when his income level exceeds that of the reference group has 
been ruled out. In contrast to the literature on inequity aversion, there is literature that propose utility gain when 
a person is better off than others, although this positive effect is weaker than the negative effect of envy on utility 
 9 
Definition 3: The utility function of a high-caste individual k  is  
( )




>−+
=≤
=
H
ckk
H
ck
k
H
k
aaifca
caaif
yu
1
1
      
Behind the veil of ignorance, individuals are aware of envy among the to-be low-caste group. 
They anticipate that some low-caste people will be born with learning abilities higher than 
that of the low-caste critical agent, Lca  ( caaa HcLcj ==> , assuming the same threshold 
level for choosing education across the castes). Such low-caste people could increase their 
productivity levels, if there were equal opportunities in access to education irrespective of 
caste. They however receive lower wages than high-caste individuals of same learning ability, 
due to their low-caste identity. They envy the high-caste individuals and incur a utility loss 
from the unfavourable wage inequality.19  
Definition 4: The utility function of an individual j  belonging to the low-caste group is 
based on other regarding preferences and is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]jjjkjjkjLj ayayayyyu −−= 11, γβ 20 
where 




=≤
=>
=
H
c
L
cj
H
c
L
cj
aaaif
aaaif
0
1
1β   
( )jj ay  and ( )jk ay  are the levels of income of the respective low-caste individual j   and the 
high-caste individual k  with the same abilities, the latter being endogenously determined by 
learning abilities. A low-caste individual j ’s total utility is equal to his income ( )jj ay  (where 
( ) [ ]1,0,1 ∈∀= jjj aay ) if his learning ability is less than that of the critical agent 
( HcLcj aaa =≤ ), i.e., when he does not envy anyone; but if a low-caste individual j  earns 
one unit less of income than the high-caste individual k , in spite of having learning ability 
                                                                                                                                                        
(see Loewenstein et al., 1989;, Banerjee, 1990; Schoeck, 1996; Goel and Thakor, 2005 et al.). Usually high 
income provides high social status due to which an individual may gain additional utility but in a caste-based 
economy high-caste individuals have an inherited right to high social status whatever be their levels of income.   
19
 See Grund and Sliwka (2002), Goel and Thakor (2005), Bartling and Siemens (2006), who likewise describe 
an envious agent incurring disutility when he or she receives a lower wage than others.   
20
 This utility function is formulated on the basis of the idea developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), but it 
differs from the latter by not considering disutility from advantageous inequity and normalization of the 
disutility since the number of individuals in the reference group is infinite in our model.  
 10 
higher than that of the critical agent ( HcLcj aaa => ), his utility is reduced by 1γ . I assume 
that 10 1 << γ  : the individual is thus envious but the intensity of envy
21
 is less than unity.22  
Proposition 1: In the presence of caste-based discrimination with the utility functions of the 
high-caste and low-caste individuals respectively given by (3) and (4), expected utility in the 
pre-compensating discrimination period behind the veil of ignorance is 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
11
2
1
2
773 1
2332 γc
cn
c
n
cccUE LL −−−−−−+−=
(
  
The proof is in Appendix A. An important notification is that this expected utility function is 
fairness consistent.23 The first term on the RHS is expected utility as in the absence of caste-
based discrimination (the benchmark case); the second and the third terms are respectively the 
expected utility losses in the pre-compensating discrimination regime resulting from 
inefficiency and envy attributable to deprivation in access to education of the low-caste 
individuals who might have innate learning abilities greater than that of the critical agent 
( HcLcj aaa => ). 
Discrimination in access to education results in differences in productivities across 
castes, which, coupled with discrimination in choice of jobs, creates inequality in incomes, 
which is the source of envy. The benefit of education is not fully reaped under caste-based 
discrimination. Expected utility under caste-based discrimination is lower than that under no 
discrimination because caste-based discrimination in the pre-compensating discrimination 
regime makes for an inefficient and inequitable allocation. 
 
                                                 
21
 The definition of intensity of envy is adopted from Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Intensity of envy is also 
measured by the resources required to convert an envious agent to non-envious one. The larger the resources 
needed to make an envious agent non-envious one, the higher is his envy intensity (Fleurbaey, 2006). It is also 
found to be larger when one can imagine, "I could be in his place" (see Heider, 1958; Elster, 1991; Parrott, 
1991), or the superiority of the person who is envied increases (Goel and Thakor, 2005). 
22
 See also Kirchsteiger (1994) who assumes an envy parameter (or intensity of envy) less than unity 
predicated on an individual having a higher regard for own income than for the incomes of the individuals in his 
or her reference group.   
23
 Varian (1974) defines the social welfare function consistent with fairness, ( )( )ji xuW , by introducing the 
other regarding preferences in the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, ( )( )ii xuW . The specific form is 
as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ijiijiii xuxuxuxW δβα ∑∑ −−= , 
where the parameters α and β are the weights assigned to efficiency and equity arguments. ijδ  is zero if there is 
no-envy and unity otherwise. 
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4.3. Compensating discrimination 
The individuals behind the veil of ignorance now know that they are going to born into a 
caste-based economy with compensating discrimination where all the individuals irrespective 
of castes are permitted access to education. The productivity level of a high-caste individual 
k  is given by (9) and that of a low-caste individual j  is   
 
1
1
L
j
j
if he or she does not chooseeducation
q
a if he or shechooses education

=  +
   (11) 
Compensating discrimination is implemented by a quota that reserves places in 
education and public sector jobs for the low-caste people. Let ℘ be the proportion of 
reserved places in the skilled sector jobs. The remaining places are allocated between the low- 
and the high-castes according to personal comparative advantage. The minimum-ability 
requirement for the reserved places is lower than that for the unreserved (general) places, 
implying that low-caste individuals have larger scope to increase their productivity levels 
under the educational reservation and they have higher returns to the same productivity level 
compared to the high-caste under the job reservation.   
4.3.1.  Autonomous education decision 
Assume that the individuals behind the veil of ignorance do not take into account the 
proportion of reserved skilled jobs (℘) but they do take into account the benefits and costs of 
the reservation policy in making education decision across the castes. An individual j  
assuming himself in to-be low-caste group decides on education if  
( ) 11 >−+ ca j ηε  ,       (12) 
where ( )1>ε  is the return to education under the job reservation policy. The higher the 
learning ability of a low-caste individual, the greater is the benefit obtained. ( )1<η  is present 
as a government subsidy on the cost of education – a proportional cost reduction – for low-
caste people accompanying the compensating discrimination policy scheme. After 
simplification, 
    
L
cj aca ˆ=> ε
η
 .         (13) 
The high-caste critical agent is defined as caa Hc
H
c ==ˆ  since 1=ε  and 1=η  for the high 
caste. It follows that caa Hc
L
c =< ˆˆ . That is, compensating discrimination provides an incentive 
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for the low-caste individuals to choose education even with learning ability lower than that of 
the high-caste critical agent, thereby raising the number of educated individuals in the low-
caste group. 
Definition 5: The utility function of a low-caste individual j  under autonomous education 
decision is 
( )





>−+
=≤
=
L
cjj
L
cj
j
L
j
aaifca
caaif
yu
ˆ1
ˆ1
ηε
ε
η
 
Since low-caste individuals are the privileged group in the compensating-discrimination 
regime, envy does not enter into their utility function. However, the individuals behind the 
veil of ignorance perceive envy among the to-be high-caste group. 
Definition 6: The utility function of a high-caste individual k  is:   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]kkkjkkjkHk ayaycayyyu −−−= 22, γβ                 
where 




≤=
>>
H
ck
H
ck
aaif
aaif
c
ˆ0
ˆ0
 and 




≤
>>≥
=
L
ck
H
ck
L
ck
H
c
aaif
aaiforaaaif
ˆ0
ˆˆˆ1
2β      
( )kj ay  and ( )kk ay  are incomes of the respective low-caste individual j  and the high-caste 
individual k , endogenously determined by their own but same learning abilities. Utility of a 
high-caste individual k  is equal to his income earned without education, ( )kk ay , if his 
learning ability is less than that of the low-caste critical agent ( Lck aa ˆ≤ ). ( )kk ay  is thus the 
utility of an uneducated envy-free high-caste individual k .  
 A high-caste individual with learning ability between the threshold levels for choosing 
education in the low- and high-caste groups ( LckHc aaa ˆˆ >≥ ) cannot choose education and 
earn the unskilled wage but could become educated and might obtain a skilled job if he or she 
were to belong to the low-caste group. Again, with ability higher than that of the high-caste 
critical agent ( Hck aa ˆ> ), an individual can become educated but obtains lower returns to 
education compared to low-caste individuals with same ability. As a result of unfavourable 
wage inequalities caused by compensating discrimination, a high-caste individual in either 
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case become envious24, 25 and incurs utility loss. The intensity of envy of the high-caste 
individuals is 2γ , where 10 2 << γ . 
Proposition 2: In the post-compensating discrimination period when the utility functions of 
the low-caste and the high-caste individuals are given by Def. (5) and Def. (6), individuals 
behind the veil of ignorance compute expected utility as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 




 −+−
−−−





 −−+




 −
−−




 −
−+
−+−
=
ε
ηεεε
γ
ε
η
ε
ηε
2
111
121
2
11
2
1
2
773
ˆ
22
2
2232
c
cn
cc
c
cn
c
cn
cccUE
L
LL
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The formal proof of the proposition 2 is in Appendix B but the important implications are as 
follows. The first term on the RHS is the expected utility equivalent to the benchmark case. 
The second term defines the expected efficiency gains resulting from compensating 
discrimination. This term has two components. In particular, Eq. (B.4) (in Appendix B) 
shows that ( ) ( )∫ −−
1
1
c
L dacacn ηε  is the expected utility gain due to low-caste individuals’ 
access to education and higher returns and ( ) ( )∫ −−
c
c
L dacacn
ε
η
ηε1  indicates expected utility 
gains due to an increase in number of the educated low-caste individuals. The third term is the 
expected utility loss from non-Pareto-improving change because low-caste individuals benefit 
at the expense of some high-caste individuals under the reservation policy. The expected 
utility loss is ( ) ( )∫ −−
1
1
c
L dacacn , which is equivalent to the expected utility loss resulting 
from inefficiency due to low-caste individuals’ being denied access to education in the pre-
compensating discrimination period.  
                                                 
24
 It might be surprising to view the high-caste individual with Hck aa ˆ>  as envious since he earns high income 
in absolute term. But utility or overall job satisfaction depends on the relative income/consumption – 
income/consumption compared to others in the reference group (see Frank, 1984; Bolton, 1991; Clark and 
Oswald, 1996; Lehmann, 2001; Goel and Thakor, 2005). In particular, Goel and Thakor (2005) specify an 
individual's preferences as based on relative consumption in addition to absolute consumption, such that the 
individual gains and loses utility according to whether his consumption exceeds and is below that of his 
reference group. 
25
 The literature on envy also reveals that people generally do envy those people who are like them or equal to 
them but turn out to be a bit superior to them (see Parrott, 1991).  
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Under the reservation policy, there are two sources of inefficiency. First, some 
reserved places can remain vacant due to non-fulfilment of the minimum productivity 
requirement: Pareto-improving change could have taken place if these reserved vacant places 
would be open for all individuals irrespective of caste. Second, the places excluding the 
reserved positions allocated on the basis of comparative advantage are insufficiently small, 
resulting in excess demand for skilled jobs. Therefore, some high-caste individuals with 
learning abilities higher than that of the high-caste critical agent, who could have skilled jobs 
in the adverse discrimination regime, are compelled to take unskilled jobs under the 
compensating discrimination regime, which is an inefficient allocation of ability. 
The fourth term (see Eq. (B.4) in Appendix) indicates the expected utility gain if the 
proportion of skilled jobs is higher than that of unskilled jobs. The fifth term defines the 
expected utility loss due to envy of high-caste people towards the low-caste with the same 
learning abilities but different levels of earning. This term also has two components. In 
particular, Eq. (B.4) (in Appendix B) reveals that ( )( ) ∫−−
c
c
L daacn
ε
η
εγ 211  is the expected 
utility loss due to envy of the uneducated high-caste individuals with learning abilities with 
L
ck
H
c aaa ˆˆ >≥ ; and ( ) ( ) ( )∫−−−
1
2 111
c
L daacn εγ  is the expected utility loss due to envy of 
educated high-caste individuals whose learning abilities are higher than that of their critical 
agent ( Hck aa ˆ> ). Therefore, the post-compensating discrimination allocation is inequitable 
and not Pareto-improving.   
Proposition 3: Assignment to jobs under the caste system in the post-compensating 
discrimination regime is efficiency-improving if the proportion of unskilled jobs is no more 
than half, but compensating discrimination is not fairness-improving. 
Proof: The assignment under compensating discrimination regime is efficiency-improving 
compared to the adverse discrimination regime if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 




 −
−−>




 −
−−




 −−+




 −
−
2
11
2
11121
2
1
222
c
cn
c
cncc
c
cn LLL
ε
η
ε
ηε
     .  
Given that 0>Ln , 1>ε , 1<η  and  ( )1,0∈c , the above inequality holds for 
2
1
≤c .  
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Further, the ratio of expected utility losses due to envy in the compensating discrimination 
regime ( )Γˆ  to that in the adverse discrimination regime ( )Γ(  is   
  
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
11
2
111
ˆ
1
2
22
2
γ
ε
ηεεε
γ
c
cn
c
cn
L
L
−
−





 −+−
−−
=
Γ
Γ
( . 
After simplification, 
 
( )
( )














−
−













−
−
=
Γ
Γ 1
1
1
1ˆ
2
2
2
1
2
c
c
n
n
L
L
ε
ε
η
ε
γ
γ
(  
Substitute ca Lc ε
η
=ˆ  and ca Hc =ˆ  so that 
 
( )








−








−
−−
=
Γ
Γ 1
ˆ1
ˆ11ˆ
2
2
1
2
H
c
L
c
L
L
a
a
n
n
ε
γ
γ
(  
With 
2
1
≤Ln  and 12 γγ = ,  
 
( ) 11
1
2 >
−
γ
γ
L
L
n
n
.  
Also 1>ε  and Hc
L
c aa ˆˆ <  implies that 
  1
ˆ1
ˆ1
2
2
>








−
−
H
c
L
c
a
a
ε . 
Therefore, 
Γ
Γ
(
ˆ
 can be larger than unity if  
11
ˆ1
ˆ1
2
2
≥








−








−
−
H
c
L
c
a
a
ε , 
which is the case either if 1>>ε  or if 1<<η  so that Hc
L
c aa ˆˆ << .  (Q.E.D.) 
There is a ‘paradox of equity’: the greater is the intent to achieve equity, the larger is the 
expected utility loss due to envy and the greater is the inequitable job assignment. 
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4.3.2. Quota (℘) dependent education decision   
After the implementation of affirmative action, the total number of educated individuals in 
the society is larger than the total number of skilled jobs: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )cccnccncn LLL −>




 −+−=




 −+−− 11111
ε
η
ε
η
  (14) 
There is therefore an excess demand for skilled jobs. If the total number of reserved places is 
at least equal to the total number of educated low-caste people ( ( ) ( ) 0ˆ11 >−≥−℘ LLc nac ), a 
low-caste person with Lcj aa ˆ>  will certainty obtain a skilled job but there is uncertainty 
about a high-caste individual even with innate ability Hck aa ˆ>  obtaining a skilled job.  
(A) Education decision of the high-caste 
The education decision among the high-caste individuals with innate abilities caa Hck => ˆ  
can be simplified and represented by a game of chicken (or "hawk-dove" game) in which 
there are two high-caste players and one skilled job. Behind the veil of ignorance, players do 
not know each others’ abilities and treat each other as equally productive in an expected 
sense. The players choose between education and non-education{ }NEE, . The game is 
symmetric, with the two identical players confronting the same costs and benefits of 
education. 
 
Player 2 
 
Not Educate Educate 
Not Educate 1, 1 1, ( ) ( ){ }aca 11 2 −−−+ εγ  
Player1 
Educate ( ) ( ){ }aca 11 2 −−−+ εγ , 1 
( ) ( ){ }aac 22 11 γπεγ ++−− , 
( ) ( ){ }aac 22 11 γπεγ ++−−  
                    Table 1: High-Caste Education Decision Game 
When both individuals decide against education, the outcome is (1, 1). The uneducated 
individuals are not envious towards the low-caste, because of their voluntary decision not to 
become educated. When one person becomes educated, he or she obtains the skilled job but 
incurs disutility due to relative deprivation when comparing own income with that of the low-
caste of same abilities: the outcome is ( ( ) ( ){ }aca 11 2 −−−+ εγ , 1) if person 1 chooses 
 17 
education or (1, ( ) ( ){ }aca 11 2 −−−+ εγ ) if person 2 become educated. When both persons 
decide on education, one of them will have to work in the unskilled sector, and will be 
envious towards the low-caste because of not having access to reserved skilled jobs.  
Conditional on being high-caste, individuals behind the veil of ignorance do not know 
who will have the skilled job and compute the expected utility from education as:   
( ) ( ){ } ( )( ) ( ) ( )aacacaca 2222 111111 γπεγεγπεγπ ++−−=−−−+−−−+             (15) 
where π  is the probability of having a skilled job and ( ) ( ){ }aca 11 2 −−−+ εγ  and 
( )ac εγ 21 −−  are respectively an educated envious high-caste person's utility from skilled 
and unskilled jobs. The outcome when both persons decide on education is 
( ( ) ( ){ }aac 22 11 γπεγ ++−− , ( ) ( ){ }aac 22 11 γπεγ ++−− ).  
There is no dominant strategy and there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, at 
( ( ) ( ){ }aca 11 2 −−−+ εγ , 1) and (1, ( ) ( ){ }aca 11 2 −−−+ εγ ) under the assumption that 
( )11 2 −−
>
εγ
c
a  so that payoff with envy in the skilled job exceeds payoff without envy in 
the unskilled jobs. The Nash equilibria are fairness-improving because total benefit is 
maximal ( ( ){ } ca −−−+= 112 2 εγ ) taking into account the equity-efficiency trade off. We 
use the game to show how the number of reserved places plays a crucial role in the education 
decision of high-caste people.  
Taking into account the possibility of obtaining either skilled or unskilled jobs when 
educated, an individual k  conditional on being high-caste will decide on education behind 
the veil of ignorance if 
  ( )( )( ) ( ) 11111 >−+−+℘−− cccac k 26     (16) 
which yields ( )
( )( )
( )℘=
℘−−
−℘+
> Hck a
c
cc
a ˆ
11
1 2
        (17) 
Lemma 1: ( ) [ )1,01ˆ0 ∈℘∀<℘< Hca  and ( )℘Hcaˆ is a convex function of ℘ and 
represented by an upward rising convex curve. 
                                                 
26
 The benefits from reserved skilled jobs, ( )rc−1 , is equal to zero for the high-persons. 
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Proof: From Eq. (17), ( )
c
c
a Hc −
=
1
0ˆ  and ( ) ∞→1ˆ Hca . ( ) 1ˆ <℘Hca  if ( )( )cc
c
−−
−
<℘
21
21
 which 
is true for 
2
10 << c . Also, ( ) ( )
( )( )
0
11
1
ˆ 2
2
>
℘−−
−+
=℘
′
c
cc
a Hc  i.e., ( )℘Hcaˆ  is increasing in ℘ and 
( ) ( )[ ]
( )( )
0
11
12
ˆ 3
2
>
℘−−
−+
=℘
″
c
cc
a Hc . By the continuity of ( )℘
′H
caˆ  for [ )1,0∈℘  Lemma 1 is 
proved. 
(B) Education decision of the low-caste 
Assumption :  ( ) ( ) LLc nac ˆ110 −<−℘<        
This assumption introduces uncertainty in obtaining reserved places in the skilled sector jobs 
for educated low-caste people. An individual j  behind the veil of ignorance conditional on 
being low caste computes expected net earnings from education as:   
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ } carcaca jjj ηεηηε −−++=−+℘−+−+℘ 111111              (18) 
Due to the limitation of the quota of reserved skilled jobs, the education decision of low-caste 
individuals (with innate ability Lcj aa ˆ> ) can be represented by a game similar to that 
described for the high-caste. Table 2 shows the possible decisions of two low-caste 
individuals with innate abilities Lcj aa ˆ>  when only one place is reserved in the skilled sector 
jobs.  
Player 2 
 Educate 
 
Not Educate 
 
Educate 
 
( )cη−1 , ( )cη−1  ( ){ }[ ]car ηε −−++ 111 , 1 
Player1 Not Educate 
     
1, ( ){ }[ ]car ηε −−++ 111  1, 1 
                        Table 2 Low-Caste Education Decision Game 
When both persons decide on education, the outcome is ( ( )cη−1 , ( )cη−1 ). When 
neither person decides to become educated, the outcome is (1, 1). Again there is no dominant 
strategy and there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, at ( ( ){ }[ ]car ηε −−++ 111 , 1) and 
(1, ( ){ }[ ]car ηε −−++ 111 ). The Nash equilibria are efficient, since total benefit is maximal 
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( ( ){ } ca ηε −−℘++= 112 ). In the mixed strategy equilibrium, a player chooses E  and NE  
with probabilities
( ){ } ( ){ } 






−℘+
−
−℘+ a
c
a
c
11
1,
11 ε
η
ε
η
. 
Therefore, some low-caste individuals in spite of having innate abilities Lcj aa ˆ>  are 
uncertain about obtaining reserved places in the skilled sector. They will either work as 
unskilled labour or occupy the unreserved places in the skilled sector through competition 
with the high-caste educated people. Taking into account these possibilities, an individual j  
behind the veil of ignorance conditional on being low caste will decide on education if 
  
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) 111111 >−+−+℘−+−+℘− cccacac jj ηηηε             (19)  
After simplification,   
  
( ) ( )[ ] ( )℘=−℘+−>
L
cj a
c
c
a ˆ
111 ε
η
      (20) 
Obviously, ( ) ( )℘<℘ HcLc aa ˆˆ .         (21) 
Lemma 2: ( ) [ ]1,01ˆ0 ∈℘∀<℘< Lca  and ( )℘Lcaˆ is a convex function of ℘ and represented 
by a downward sloping convex curve. 
Proof: From Eq. (20), ( )
c
c
a Lc −
=
1
0ˆ η  and ( )
( )c
c
a Lc −
=
1
1ˆ
ε
η
, which implies that 
( ) ( ) 10ˆ1ˆ0 <<< LcLc aa . Also, ( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
0
11
1
1
1
ˆ 2 <





−℘+
−
−
−
=℘
′
ε
εη
c
c
a Lc , i.e., ( )℘Lcaˆ  is 
decreasing in ℘ and ( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
0
11
2
1
1
ˆ 3
2
>





−℘+−
−
=℘
″
ε
εη
c
c
a Lc . By the continuity of ( )℘
′L
caˆ  
for [ ]1,0∈℘ , Lemma 2 is proved. 
Definition 7: The utility function of a low-caste individual j  is 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( )( )









−℘−∈=
−℘∈>
>−+
−℘+−
=≤
=
cjif
cjif
andaaifca
c
c
aaif
yu
L
cjj
L
cj
j
L
j
111
11
ˆ1
111
ˆ1
εηε
ε
η
 
The utility function in (7) is similar to that in (5) but (7) is based on the quota (℘) dependent 
education decision. Likewise, a high-caste person's utility function is given by (6) taking into 
account ℘.  
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Proposition 4: In the compensating discrimination regime when the utility functions of the 
high-caste and the low-caste individuals are given by (6) and (7), individuals behind the veil 
of ignorance compute expected utility as 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
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

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The formal proof of the proposition 4 is in Appendix C. The terms on the RHS have similar 
interpretations to those in proposition 2. 
Proposition 5: The greater is the intensity of envy ( 2γ ) in the compensating discrimination 
regime, the lower is the size of the quota (℘) chosen by the individuals behind the veil of 
ignorance, if 
( ) ε
ε 1
1
−
≥
−℘ c
c
. 
Proof: The proof is in Appendix D.  
Individuals behind the veil of ignorance do not know whether they will be low-caste, 
and therefore they do not know whether they will benefit from the quota. Because they 
perceive the feeling of envy among to-be high-caste in the presence of quota, they take 
account of the utility losses attributed to inequity when deciding on the quota of reserved 
jobs. They therefore consider the effect of a change in 2γ  on ∗℘ . 
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4.4.  Diagrammatical representation 
 
Figure 1: Utility loss due to envy 
Figure 1 shows the utility functions of a representative high-caste ( cau H −+= 1 ) and low-
caste individual ( 1=Lu ) in the adverse discrimination regime as XBY  and XX . Learning 
ability is measured on the horizontal axis. The horizontal line XX  reflects the fact that the 
utility of the low-caste individuals is independent of learning ability, since they do not have 
access to education under adverse discrimination. XBY  represents the utility of the high-caste 
person endogenously determined by innate learning ability.  
 Under the compensating discrimination regime, low-caste individuals are allowed to 
be educated. They obtain higher returns ( )1>ε  and benefit from subsidized cost of education 
( )1<η . Therefore, their utility function ( cau L ηε −+= 1ˆ ) is kinked and given by XXA ′ , 
which has steeper slope than the corresponding function of high-caste individuals, the latter 
being the same both under adverse and compensating discrimination regimes. 
Utility loss due to envy of the low-caste people by the high-caste in the adverse 
discrimination regime is 
 ( )221
2
1
2
1
ccDCBCBCD +−=××=∆  
Utility loss due to envy of the high-caste people in the compensating discrimination regime is 
 +∆ ABF Area of quadrilateral BDEF  
or equivalently,   
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5. Conclusion 
I have incorporated envy into choice of compensating discrimination policies behind a veil of 
ignorance and shown how a reversal of envy occurs. In the choice behind the veil of 
ignorance, it is known that under adverse discrimination low-caste people will be denied 
access to education and skilled-job opportunities, and that with a policy of compensating 
discrimination high-caste people will be denied the same opportunities. Because of 
differences in returns to education due to differences in minimum requirements for the 
reserved places for the low-caste and unreserved places for the high-caste, a high-caste 
individual's earnings are either less than those of a low-caste individual with similar intrinsic 
ability or equal to that of a less productive low-caste individual. The inter-caste inequality 
resulting from adverse discrimination makes the low-caste individuals envious towards the 
high-caste people. Compensating discrimination reverses the direction of envy.  
 There is inefficiency when, under adverse discrimination, low-caste individuals are 
denied access to educational opportunities and good jobs. Under the compensating-
discrimination job reservation policy, low-caste individuals obtain access to skilled jobs that 
are unavailable to high-caste individuals with similar intrinsic ability. In either case the 
outcomes are inequitable and inefficient. 
 The expected utility loss due to envy under reverse discrimination is greater than that 
under adverse discrimination, if extensive privilege is provided to low-caste people. In that 
case there is a paradox of equity. A compensating-discrimination policy is not, therefore, 
necessarily fairness-improving. 
 Allocation of ability and the paradox of equity under the reservation policy impede 
efficiency outcomes. Compensating discrimination policies provide greater incentives for the 
low-caste people to be educated but envy then results in more inefficiency because of the 
diminished incentives of the potentially productive high-caste people to choose to become 
 23 
educated. The effect of recognizing envy therefore compels the individuals behind the veil of 
ignorance to choose a reduced quota when the intensity of envy parameter is higher. 
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Appendices        
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1 
The total utility of the high-caste group computed by Def. (3) is as follows 
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and the total utility of the low-caste group computed by Def. (4) is as follows 
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Behind the veil of ignorance the individuals compute the expected utility under the adverse 
discrimination regime as:  
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Using the linearity property of the definite integral the above equation can be rewritten as 
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Eq. (A.4) defines the expected utility computed by the individuals behind the veil of 
ignorance when they know that they will confront the objective probabilities of belonging 
 24 
either to the low-caste or to the high-caste groups and the subjective probabilities27 of having 
innate abilities either higher or lower than the threshold level for choosing education. After 
computation Eq. (A.4) yields expected utility obtained in proposition 1.    (Q.E.D.) 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2 
The total utility of the low-caste group can be computed by Def. (5) as 
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and the total utility of the high-caste group can be computed by Def. (6) as follows: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]











>−−−+
>≥−
≤
=
∫
∫
∫
1
ˆ
2
ˆ
ˆ
2
ˆ
0
ˆ11
ˆˆ1
ˆ
,
H
c
H
c
L
c
L
c
a
H
ck
L
ck
H
c
a
a
L
ck
a
jk
H
aaifdaaca
aaaifdaa
aaifda
yyu
εγ
εγ            (B.2) 
Behind the veil of ignorance the individuals compute the expected utility consistent with 
fairness under the compensating discrimination regime as: 
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Using the linearity property and the property of additivity of integration on intervals Eq. (B.3) 
can be written as follows 
                                                 
27
 The subjective probabilities have been transformed into objective probabilities of getting the skilled and 
unskilled jobs. 
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After computation Eq. (B.4) yields expected utility under compensating discrimination 
regime.        (Q.E.D.) 
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 4 
Taking into account (℘) the individuals behind the veil of ignorance compute the expected 
utility as: 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) 



































−+℘−+
−−−+℘
−+












−+−+




















−+℘−+−+℘−+=
∫
∫
∫∫
∫∫∫
℘−−
−℘+
℘−−
−℘+℘−−
−℘+
−℘+−
−℘+−
−℘+−−℘+−
−℘+−
1
11
1
1
11
1
2
11
1
111
2
111
0
1
111
1
111
111
0
2
2
2
11
11
111
1111ˆ
c
cc
c
cc
c
cc
c
c
c
c
L
c
c
c
c
c
c
L
daca
daaca
cdaadacn
dacadacacdacnUE
εγ
εγ
ηηε
ε
η
ε
η
ε
η
ε
η
ε
η
            (C.1)     
Using the linearity property and the property of additivity of integration on intervals Eq. (C.1) 
can be written as follows 
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Proceeding further,  
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) 











−℘−+−−












−−+−−−












−℘−+−℘−+












−℘−+−℘−+












−+−+=
∫∫
∫∫∫
∫∫
∫∫
∫∫
℘−−
−℘+
℘−−
−℘+
−℘+−
℘−−
−℘+
−℘+−
℘−−
−℘+
−℘+−℘−−
−℘+
℘−−
−℘+
℘−−
−℘+
℘−−
−℘+
−℘+−
℘−−
−℘+
−℘+−
℘−−
−℘+
℘−−
−℘+
1
11
1
11
1
111
2
11
1
111
11
1
111
1
11
1
1
11
1
1
11
1
11
1
111
11
1
111
1
11
1
11
1
0
2
2
22
2
22
22
2
2
111
11
11
11
11ˆ
c
cc
c
cc
c
c
L
c
cc
c
c
c
cc
c
c
L
c
cc
L
c
cc
c
cc
L
c
cc
c
c
c
cc
c
c
L
c
cc
c
cc
daacdaacn
dacdacndacacn
dacadacacn
dacadacacn
dacacdacUE
εεγ
ηηε
ηηε
ε
η
ε
η
ε
η
ε
η
ε
η
           (C.3) 
After computation Eq. (C.3) yields expected utility obtained in proposition 4.  (Q.E.D.) 
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 5 
Substituting Eqs. (17) and (20) the expected utility computed in proposition 4 can be 
rewritten as a function of the decision variable ℘ as: 
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The first order condition for the expected utility maximization with respect to ℘ has the 
following appearance: 
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The second order condition (SOC) for maximization requires that 
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From Eq. (D.2) the optimal amount of quota, *℘  is obtained.  
In order to prove proposition 5 the implicit function rule is applied to the first order 
condition in Eq. (D.2). It yields, 
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The denominator is obviously negative since it is the second order (sufficient) condition for 
expected utility maximisation. The sign of the numerator is ambiguous. Using Lemma 1 and 
lemma 2 it is found that if ( )( ) 011 ≥−−℘− εε cc , i.e., 
( ) ε
ε 1
1
−
≥
−℘ c
c
, the numerator 
becomes positive implying that 0
2
<
℘
γd
d
.    (Q.E.D.) 
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